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Abstract 
Historians and social scientists generally understand nationalism to be the defining feature of 
fascism. This study challenges that assumption with the examination of Swedish fascist movements 
through the concept of self-identity. Based on interwar fascist periodicals, the development of 
Swedish fascists‘ self-identity in relation to race, nation, and the signifiers of ‗fascism‘ and 
‗National Socialism‘, is traced from the early 1920s when an overt attachment to Mussolini‘s 
model was displayed, through a National Socialist phase showing a cautious commitment to Nazi 
Germany, ending with a final phase of ‗anonymisation‘. In the face of criticism that their ideology 
was alien to Sweden, fascists adapted their self-representation to accommodate nationalist 
commitments, developing a transnational racialist ideology believed to be more in tune with 
Swedish political culture. When public opinion turned decisively against ‗international fascism‘ in 
the mid-1930s, they were forced to discard the name and image of ‗fascism‘ altogether, in a final 
phase of anonymisation, which however did not entail any significant ideological metamorphosis. 
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Below I will consider fascist self-identity in Sweden, what I argue is its awkward relationship to 
nationalism, and how that relationship drove ideological change. Fascism is commonly understood 
by most scholars to be an essentially nationalist phenomenon, but upon examining fascist 
movements in interwar Sweden, it becomes apparent that the matter is more complex and 
sometimes requires a more nuanced approach to the nationalist aspect of their ideology. As I will 
show, while Swedish fascists in the 1920s generally did identify their ideology as essentially 
nationalist, it did not take long before that identification was significantly altered. 
  
Criticism, from supporters and opponents, that fascism was an ‗alien ideology‘ to Sweden, sparked 
internal discussions about the nature of fascism and particularly its relationship to nationalism 
among self-identified fascists. This discourse of fascists about fascism was an important factor in 
the transformation of Swedish fascist ideology, and drove its evolution through the interwar years. 
This was by no means only the case in Sweden. Fascists everywhere on the continent were 
2 
constantly subject to pressure to adapt tactically, whenever their ideology was compared to or 
compromised by great, but foreign, role models like Italy and Germany.
1
 
 
Self-identity is here a central concept employed to map the ideological development of Swedish 
fascism, which sets the scope and limits of this chapter. The aim is to show how identification with 
fascism in and of itself presented ideological conundrums, and impacted ideological development, 
through external criticism and internal debate. Firstly, this should not be taken to mean that there 
were no other factors in Swedish fascist ideological development; personal rivalries, tactical 
disagreements, and especially the divide between radical and conservative wings, are all elements 
that played a significant role in Swedish fascist ideology, but fall outside the scope of this analysis. 
Secondly, this examination only concerns those political organisations which overtly identified 
themselves with fascism or National Socialism, meaning that while the relationship between 
identity and ideology is foregrounded, inclusion of groups in the analysis is based on identifying as 
fascist, not ideological content. 
 
Notably, this approach considers National Socialist identity as a form of fascist identity. This is 
crucial, since in the case of Sweden it would be frequently unhelpful to distinguish between the 
two. The rapid nominal change, from fascist to National Socialist, in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
of Swedish organisations did not constitute an ideological upheaval, but was an important stage in 
developing their tactics of identity and representation. Such a development was not unique to 
Sweden either – something similar happened with the British Union of Fascists for instance, which 
added ‗and National Socialists‘ to its name in the mid-1930s. Therefore, for the present purpose, 
National Socialism will be regarded as a type of fascist identity, even if some contemporaries took 
a different view. 
   
The main source material used for the study of fascist self-identification is party periodicals. 
Newspapers published by various fascist parties are examined as a means of tracing the internal 
discourses about fascists‘ understanding of their ideology. Since the interwar period saw no single 
fascist group establish definitive predominance over the others, at least until 1936, there will be no 
specific focal point. The picture presented instead is an overview of certain discursive trends 
amongst a smörgåsbord of fascist groups. That being said, special attention will be paid to the first 
fascist movement of any size worth mentioning, Sveriges Fascistiska Folkparti och 
Kamporganisation [SFKO, Sweden‘s Fascist People‘s Party and Combat Organisation], outwardly 
led by Konrad Otto Hallgren, together with Sven Hedengren and Sven Olov Lindholm, and its 
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 Cf. the case of the NSB in the Netherlands in relation to Nazi Germany, in Dietrich Orlow, The Lure of 
Fascism in Western Europe: German Nazis, Dutch and French Fascists, 1933-1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), pp. 57–59; See also Robin te Slaa and Edwin Klijn, De NSB: Ontstaan en Opkomst van de 
Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, 1931-1935 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), pp. 257–64. 
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successor permutations, particularly Lindholm‘s Nationalsocialistiska Arbetarepartiet [NSAP, 
National Socialist Workers‘ Party], which by the late 1930s had managed to become the largest, 
and certainly most conspicuous, of Sweden‘s fascist parties. 
 
Swedish fascism is characterised by factionalism and internal disputes, and an intense rivalry 
between groups at their own expense, dedicating a significant portion of their propaganda to 
fighting each other.
2
 In the words of Swedish historian Hans Dahlberg: ‗[e]veryone hated each 
other. A study of Swedish Nazism is a study of egotistical spite …and verbal crudeness of the 
lowest sort.‘3 Space does not permit a comprehensive account of the divisiveness of Swedish 
fascist politics here;
4
 but suffice to say, this was partly because of, and doubtless exacerbated by, 
the lack of effective and competent leadership, as well as the far-flung geographical spread of 
fascists across the country. The many divisions in Swedish fascism prevented a single 
interpretation of fascism being imposed or accepted, and thus greatly encouraged ideological 
discussion and acrimonious debate between the parties. Nevertheless, all movements in Sweden 
can be understood to participate in essentially the same discourses of political self-identity. 
Swedish historian Lena Berggren has written what serves as a good introduction to the Swedish 
fascist scene. Her 2002 article ‗Swedish Fascism: Why Bother?‘ rejects the conventional copycat 
label for Swedish fascism,
5
 and analyses the Swedish variant in its own right without losing sight 
of the international context. However, Berggren does not explore the discursive identity politics of 
this scene, or the peculiar relationship between fascism and nationalism, and ideology and identity.
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Förintelsen (Stockholm: Bonniers, 2011), p. 304. 
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 Lena Berggren, ‗Swedish Fascism: Why Bother?‘, Journal of Contemporary History, 37.3 (2002), 395–417 
(pp. 395–417); She also made the same argument in Swedish, in Lena Berggren, ‗Den Svenska 
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‗Fascism is not for export‘, Mussolini famously declared March, 1928.7 Yet this never did much to 
prevent organisations all over Europe from taking up the fascist name, often in a highly fertile and 
creative fashion, as António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis have recently suggested.
8
 Sweden was 
no exception. Regardless of Mussolini‘s intentions, fascism did not remain an Italian idea, but 
became a European phenomenon.
9
  In Sweden, fascism‘s Italian origins and character were 
explicitly acknowledged.
10
 The weekly political newspaper Nationen [The Nation], owned by one 
of the ‗ancestral fathers of fascism in Sweden‘, Elof Eriksson, was lavish with praise for the Duce 
and the extraordinary changes he brought about in Italy.
11
 In 1925, when his paper functioned as a 
mouthpiece for SFKO, fascism was acknowledged to be ‗in its origins, its development, its theses, 
and its results, a specifically Italian phenomenon‘.12  
 
Nationen proclaimed the necessity of freeing Sweden from the yoke of ‗Jewish cosmopolitanism‘. 
It advocated fascism as the means of doing so, as it was Mussolini who showed the only possible 
path, in spite of his lack of concern for a ‗Jewish question‘.13 Eventually Mussolini saw the value 
for the reputation of fascism to cultivate admirers abroad, though they did not need Mussolini‘s 
approval to embrace the creed and name of fascism, or acknowledge Mussolini‘s influence.14 In 
Spöknippet [The Fasces], weekly newspaper of SFKO once abandoned by Eriksson, an article by 
the Austrian Franz Haiser was published in response to Mussolini‘s 1928 disavowal of 
international fascism: ‗This by no means changes the fact that he is a genius, inimitable giant, who 
possesses the rare gift of taking the personal will of millions, and giving them a higher, more ideal 
will in its stead.‘ Mussolini was the first to put these ideas into practice, and to give them a name, 
Haiser argued, but fascists elsewhere could retain the name, as fascism supposedly pre-dated 
Mussolini in its essence – a political force beyond history.15 
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 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 
463. 
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 Introduction to Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe, ed. by António Costa Pinto and Aristotle 
Kallis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 1–5. 
9
 Henrik Arnstad, ‗Fascismens Föränderlighet 1919-2014: De Svartbruna Rörelserna i ett Kontextuellt 
Perspektiv‘, Historisk Tidskrift, 134.2 (2014), 259–66 (pp. 260–61). 
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 See for instance Lena Berggren, ‗Intellectual Fascism: Per Engdahl and the Formation of ―New-Swedish 
Socialism‖‘, Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascism Studies, 2014, 69–92 (p. 72). 
11
 Wärenstam, pp. 27–30. 
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 ‗Fascismen är i sitt ursprung, sin utveckling, sina teser och sina resultat ett specifikt italienskt fenomen.‘ 
‗Mussolinis stora författningsreform: Ett föredöme för andra länder‘, Nationen, no 10 (1925), p. 4. 
13
 ‗Fram för den nationella fascismen‘, Nationen, no 23, June (1926), p. 2. 
14
 The difficulty of organising fascism internationally became evident at the Fascist International Congress 
organised by CAUR. One Swedish group attended, the Swedish National Union of Youth. Michael Arthur 
Ledeen, Universal Fascism: The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International, 1928-1936. (New York,: 
Howard Fertig, 1972), pp. 115–21. 
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 ‗Detta förändrar dock ingalunda det faktum, att han är en genialisk, oförliknelig jätte, som äger den 
sällsynta gåvan att beröva millioner deras egen personliga vilja och inge dem en högre, ideellare.‘ Franz 
Haiser, ‗Vad är fascism?‘ Spöknippet, no 4 (1928), p. 4. 
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Italian Fascism was the great role model of the mid-twenties, but already in 1929 SFKO established 
contacts with the NSDAP, as key members were invited to the Nuremberg Parteitage.
16
 Sigurd and 
Gunnar Furugård had met the NSDAP leadership as early as 1923, and founded the short-lived 
Svenska Nationalsocialistiska Frihetsförbundet [SNF, Swedish National Socialist Freedom 
League] in 1924.
17
 Elof Eriksson had several close connections in Germany, in particular Erich 
Ludendorff.
18
 In 1930, the newspaper Nationalsocialisten encouraged others to ‗look to the 
example of Germany‘s struggle for freedom and to unite in Sweden‘s struggle for freedom in 
National Socialism‘.19 Riksposten, mouthpiece of Martin Ekström‘s Nationalsocialistiska Blocket 
[NSB, National Socialist Block], referred to fascism as a European return to reason: ‗It awoke first 
in Italy—the classical country of the Renaissance. Germany followed. Will it awaken in the rest of 
Europe also?‘20 Open acknowledgment of fascists‘ ideological debt to Italy and Germany was 
common in Sweden during the twenties, and would remain so until about 1933.  
 
However, the relationship between Swedish fascists and their foreign relatives was never entirely 
unequivocal. During this same period, corresponding roughly to the first decade of Swedish 
fascism, they displayed a concern with the nationalist implications of their relationship to Italy and 
Germany. The newspaper articles of this decade were troubled that the foreign appearance of 
fascism repelled other nationalists, and indeed critics were keen to portray fascism as an ‗alien 
ideology‘.21 Accusations that the fascist parties were financed by Mussolini or Hitler were typical. 
SFKO was accused of taking orders from Rome, and felt the need to formally deny in June 1927, 
on its front page, any verbal or written contact with any Italian organisation.
22
 Similarly, 
Lindholm‘s NSAP was regularly accused of taking financial aid from Nazi Germany, though no 
conclusive proof was brought forward.
23
 Until the end of his life Lindholm maintained they 
received no money from Germany, and regretted what little contact they had with the NSDAP.
24
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‗Nationalsocialistisk front i Tyskland‘, Nationalsocialisten, no 4, May (1930), p. 3. 
20
 ‗Mot all förmodan, säger Spengler i inledningen till detta verk, har den europeiska självbesinningen börjat 
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‗One can hear on a daily basis that most of the newspapers‘ readers consider Swedish fascism to 
work along the same lines as Italian fascism‘, Spöknippet complained in 1926.25 ‗You fascists, 
manly and strong, struggle for Swedishness [svenskhet], [but] publically you display a sign with a 
foreign-sounding name, which many good Swedish men and women can hardly even pronounce‘, 
one otherwise sympathetic reader wrote to SFKO.
26
 Interest for the still new and exciting ideology 
clearly moved nationalists to consider indigenous fascist groups. However, it would also seem that 
upon cursory examination sympathisers could be repulsed by the unfamiliar appearance of the 
fascist name and image. 
 
In a 1933 article, ‗Is national socialism an ―un-Swedish‖ movement?‘, Den Svenske 
Nationalsocialisten argued they could at most be accused of using a German organisational form 
and tactic, but nothing else.
27
 The issue was raised time and time again, suggesting that it presented 
a significant problem for the fascists, to the point where it became a political stick to beat rival 
fascists. For instance, NSB‘s Riksposten used the accusation to slander other fascist parties, 
claiming that unlike others, the NSB was wholly adapted to indigenous Swedish conditions and not 
influenced by the Germans, ‗such as sadly still occurs sometimes, here and there‘.28 In another 
article commenting on the collapse of the Danish National Socialist Workers‘ Party, it was noted: 
‗It was hardly more than one expected, for under the current conditions in Denmark, and the insane 
fashion in which Lembeke copied the German movement, the consequences could hardly have 
been any different.‘29 The obvious foreign connections with fascism, be they Italian or German, 
were perceived to be in conflict with nationalist interests that fascists promoted. Nationalism, and 
the way it was expressed by fascists in terms of xenophobia, racism, reverent respect for national 
traditions and history, and the veneration of the sacred nation, was in constant tension with the 
persistent notion that fascism was inherently foreign. 
 
This conflict between nationalism and fascist self-identity perturbed the fascist movements,
30
 so it 
is not surprising that accusations of being an ‗alien ideology‘ acted as a catalyst to stir ideological 
25
 ‗De flesta av tidningarnas läsare anser den svenska fascismen arbeta after samma riktlinjer, som den 
italienska, vilket man dagligen kan höra.‘, ‘Fria ord‘, Spöknippet, no 4, November (1926), p. 4. 
26
 ‗Ni fascister, som så manligt och kraftigt kämpa för svenskhet, ni visa utåt en skylt med ett utländskt 
klingande namn, som många goda svenska män och kvinnor knappast ens kunna uttala.‘, Håkan Svensk, 
‗Vårt Namn‘, Spöknippet, no 14, April (1928), p. 1. 
27
 Gisle, ‗Är nationalsocialismen en osvensk rörelse?‘, Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten, no 7, April (1933), 
p. 2. 
28
 ‗Då så skett och rörelsen i sin helhet lämpat sina idéer efter rent svenska förhållanden utan någon som helst 
tysk efterapning, sådan förekommer sorgligt nog fortfarande på sina håll...‘, ‗Svensk Nationalsocialism‘, 
Riksposten, no 11, August (1934), p. 3. 
29
 ‗Det var knappast mer än vad man väntade sig, ty med de förhållandena som råda i Danmark och med det 
vansinniga sätt varpå Lembeke kopierade den tyska rörelsen kunde följden icke bli någon annan.‘, ‗D.N.A.P. 
upplöst‘, Riksposten, no 15, September (1934), p. 3. 
30
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Fakta, Årtal, Kartor, Tabeller (Stockholm: Rabén Prisma (Tiden Athena), 1997), p. 230. 
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change in Swedish fascism. Although Swedish fascists had long been keen to acknowledge their 
influences, the first decade of their existence was also one of debate about the extent and nature of 
these influences. From the beginning, there was a discernable unease between nationalism and 
fascism. 
 
Against the barrage of criticism of fascism‘s foreign nature – from political opponents and allies 
alike – fascists in Sweden used a range of different counter-arguments intended to show that 
fascism was ultimately in harmony with Swedish history. One common response was to explain 
fascism as a European or global movement; originating in Italy, but with national permutations. 
‗We cannot really answer the question as to what fascism is in general, because fascism is 
individual, or rather national, to such an extent that each country offers its own type of fascism, the 
type that can be seen as the most appropriate for the country in question‘, Spöknippet stated in its 
first issue.
31
 The theories of fascism given by fascists differed between parties, periodicals, and 
over time, but some general themes are clear. The notion of a genus of fascism with different 
species in each country, so familiar to scholars of fascism today, was often used by interwar 
fascists to justify themselves.
32
 As Pär Dahlberg in Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten put it, in an 
article entitled ‗Swedish and German National Socialism: each country must create its own social 
form along nationally specific lines‘, ‗It is true that national socialism had its origins on German 
soil, but it is precisely through its foundational idea that it can become a blessing for all Nordic 
people‘. It concludes by asserting that, no matter how closely related, Germany is not Sweden, and 
the conditions for the national reawakening of the former were not necessarily present in the 
latter.
33
  Thus fascists aimed both to dispel the worries of the voters they tried to attract, reassuring 
them they would try nothing too frightfully foreign or radical like in Italy or Germany, while 
simultaneously reaffirming their nationalist identity.
34
 Fascist ideology was fully adapted to 
Sweden‘s national situation; or in the words of Spöknippet: ‗Of course, the main feature of fascism 
is its strong national character, which it has retained in each country where it has gained a 
foothold‘.35 
31
 ‗Att besvara frågan vad fascism i allmänhet är, är ej gott emedan fascismen är så individuell eller rättare 
sagt nationell, att varje land erbjuder sin särskilda typ av fascism, den typ som kan anses vara den 
lämpligaste för landet i fråga.‘, G.S., ‗Sann och falsk fascism‘, Spöknippet, no 1, October (1926), p. 4. 
32
 Cf. the Dutch NSB history, Voor Volk en Vaderland: De Strijd der Nationaal Socialistische Beweging 
1931 - 14 December - 1941, ed. by Cornelis van Geelkerken, 2nd edn (Utrecht: Nenasu, 1943), pp. 13–15; 
See also José Streel, ‗Fascism‘s Century‘, in Fascism, ed. by Roger Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), pp. 206–7. 
33
 ‗Det är sant att nationalsocialismen haft sitt ursprung på tysk botten, men just genom sin grundidé kan den 
bli till välsignelse för alla nordiskt betingade folk.‘, Pär Dahlberg, ‗Svensk och tysk nationalsocialism‘, Den 
Svenske Nationalsocialisten, no 5, March (1933), p. 6. 
34
 Though many hostile critics remained utterly unconvinced, as the democratic press often remained hellbent 
on portraying Swedish fascists as fifth columnists for the Germans. See for instance Sastamoinen, p. 36. 
35
 ‗Visserligen är huvudegenskapen i fascismen den starka nationella prägel, som densamma erhållit i varje 
land, där den vunnit insteg...‘, Håkan Svensk, ‗Vårt namn‘, Spöknippet, no 14, April (1928), p. 1. 
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Another trend in the discourse of fascist self-identity in Sweden during this period tried to de-
emphasise the significance of Italy and Germany as role models, which turned out to be a crucial 
step in the evolution of Swedish fascism. In 1928, Spöknippet argued that Italy had started the 
struggle for a new epoch, but that the idea of fascism had existed long before then, reifying the idea 
of fascism as an ahistorical entity. ‗Swedish fascism is a living expression of this view 
[åskådning]… Its origin, its thought, and its form is purely Swedish, but the impulse for its creation 
came from a foreign country: it is a Nordic spring flower, summoned by a more southern sun.‘36 
The NSFP said they had much to learn from the German movement in purely organisational terms, 
but ‗politically nothing, for the Sweden and Germany of today are political antipodes. Therefore, to 
cite a bunch of statements of national socialists, who are no doubt prominent in Germany, is more 
likely to work against, rather than promote, the purely Swedish national socialism‘ [italics in 
original].
37
 
 
The visual image of fascism was no less important. ‗We deny that we introduced the colour black 
from Mussolini‘s Italy, for in our country too the black shirts were once worn by men, who truly 
dared something for their Fatherland.‘38 ‗Spöknippet has deep roots in our Swedish history‘, they 
claimed: it was supposedly derived from ‗stormvasen‘, the coat of arms of the sixteenth century 
king Gustav Vasa.
39
 This tactic of portraying historical figures as fascist was not unique to Sweden 
either; fascists everywhere naturally proclaimed respectable national heroes to be fascist.
40
 
Riksposten argued, rather improbably, that Gustav Vasa was a foundational figure for Swedish 
fascism: ‗This teaching about the people‘s community [folkgemenskap] is not foreign import into 
our country. It had already inspired the two men who have had the strongest hold on the soul of the 
36
 ‗Den svenske fascismen är ett levande uttryck för denna åskådning. Till sitt ursprung, sin tanke och sin 
form är den rent svensk, men impulsen till dess skapande har kommit från ett främmande land: den är en 
nordisk vårblomma, som framkallats från en sydligare sol.‘ ‗Fascistisk idealism‘, Spöknippet, no 6, February 
(1928), p. 1. 
37
 ‗Visserligen ha vi kanske mångt och mycket att lära av den tyska rörelsen, rent organisatoriskt sett, men 
politiskt ha vi inget, ty Sverige och Tyskland av i dag äro två utpräglat politiska antipoder. Att därför citera 
en massa uttalande av, utan tvivel i Tyskland framstående nationalsocialister, är därför mera ägnat att 
motarbeta än främja den rent svenska nationalsocialismen.‘ Konrad Hallgren, ‗Nationalsocialismen och 
ledartanken‘, Nationalsocialisten, nos 16-17, November (1930), p. 7. 
38
 ‗Att vi infört den svarta färgen från Mussolinis Italien bestrida vi, ty även i vårt land hava de svarta 
skjortorna även en gång förut burits av män, vilka i verkligheten vågat något för sitt Fosterland.‘ ‗Den svarta 
färgen‘, Spöknippet, no 2, October (1926), p. 1. See also: Heureka, ‗Den Svarta Skjortan‘, Spöknippet, no 29, 
July (1928), p. 3. The author refers to the 18
th
 century privateer Lars Gathenhielm, authorized by Charles XII 
to attack pirate and enemy ships. 
39
 ‗Spöknippet har djupa rötter i vår svenska historia.‘ ‗De svenska fascistemblemens innebörd‘, Spöknippet, 
no 13, March (1927), p. 2. 
40
 Probably symptomatic of the nationalist trend to romanticise historical figures as national symbols. See 
Olle Larsson and Andreas Marklund, Svensk Historia (Lund: Historiska Media, 2012), p. 315. Examples in 
other countries are the Dutch NSB, which declared Golden Age admiral Michiel de Ruyter to be a real fascist 
icon, while the BUF in Britain regularly proclaimed William Shakespeare a proto-fascist. 
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Swedish people: Engelbrekt and Gustav Vasa.‘41 Between the foundation of Swedish fascism in 
1924, and about 1933, the ‗alien ideology‘ criticism pushed fascist discourse towards the 
naturalisation of the ideology, and to establish fascism as inherently Swedish. By qualifying their 
admiration for Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and emphasising fascism‘s authentically nationalist 
character, a new path opened up in the evolution of Swedish fascism. 
 
By 1933, most Swedish fascist groups had exchanged the name of ‗fascism‘ for ‗National 
Socialism‘. In 1929, following the first party congress in October that year,42 SFKO explained that 
fascism was ‗in our country purely national socialist‘, and they proceeded to refer to themselves as 
mostly National Socialist and only occasionally as fascist.
43
 The swastika was adopted as the party 
symbol in 1930, and was proclaimed to be an ancient Nordic symbol known to ‗us Nordics, long 
before we knew the cross of Christ‘.44  In 1930, Konrad Hallgren left the SFKO, which merged 
with Nysvenska Folkförbundet [New-Swedish People‘s League] and the Furugårds‘ SNF, and 
renamed itself Sveriges Nationalsocialistiska Parti [SNSP, National Socialist Party of Sweden], 
under the leadership of the veterinary surgeon Birger Furugård. In 1933-1936 Lindholm would be 
Furugårds principal rival, as the former led a left-wing breakaway movement, Nationalsocialistiska 
Arbetarepartiet [NSAP, National Socialist Workers‘ Party], until Furugård gave up politics and 
SNSP members were urged to join the NSAP.
45
 
 
The trend towards adopting the signifier ‗National Socialism‘ instead of ‗fascism‘ in the early 
1930s did not mean a simple turn to German Nazism, but also to Sweden‘s own indigenous 
racialist currents. While some still sought to naturalise fascism as a Swedish nationalist ideology, 
this option was increasingly displaced by a focus on the superiority of the Swedish, Nordic, or 
Aryan race. An early sign of this coming trend appeared in 1928, in Spöknippet: 
 
Of course [fascism] struggles in all countries for a national renaissance, a Christian 
overhaul and moral, psychological, and physical strength and health seen in the light 
of racial research and anti-Semitism, but firstly this struggle is entirely Aryan, 
secondly Christianity is on the whole the religion of the Aryans, and lastly the Aryan 
41
 ‗Denna lära om folkgemenskapen är inget [sic] främmande importvara i vårt land. Den besjälade redan de 
två män, som haft det starkaste greppet om svenska folkets själ: Engelbrekt och Gustav Vasa.‘ ‗Vad är 
nationalsocialism?‘, Riksposten, no 9, July (1934), p. 1. 
42
 Carlsson, p. 24. 
43
 ‗... och därför är fascismen i vårt land rent nationalsocialistisk!‘, ‗Nationalsocialism och fascism‘, 
Spöknippet, no 45, November (1929), p. 2. 
44
 ‗Symbolen för ljusets allkraft har hakkorset emellertid varit för oss nordbord, långt innan vi kände Kristi 
kors.‘ ‗Under Hakkorset‘, Spöknippet, no 7, June (1930), p. 2. 
45
 Carlsson, pp. 29–35. 
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spirit is completely different from that of other races. [...] What we have pointed out 
here is how fascism is not international, but Aryan-universal.
46
 
 
The timing of this development suggests the influence of Nazi racism, still leaving the fascists open 
to ‗alien ideology‘ criticism. But it is important to remember that biological racism and eugenics 
pre-dated fascism in Sweden, and Europe for that matter. Late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Europe was the intellectual breeding ground for Social Darwinism and eugenics. Combined 
with anxieties about degeneration and race, these ideas spawned many intellectuals devoted to 
some form of biological racism.
47
 Swedish fascists themselves stated, truthfully enough, that they 
were building upon their own national racialist and anti-Semitic traditions, claiming internationally 
renowned figures like the Swedish anti-liberal political scientist, Rudolf Kjellén, who also 
influenced the Swedish leader of the Right, Arvid Lindman.
48
 Racial biology and eugenics were 
subjects commonly discussed in both scientific and political forums since the turn of the century all 
over Europe, with Sweden one of the world‘s first countries to implement measures for the 
promotion of ‗racial hygiene‘.49 During the 1930s, Social Democrats advocated eugenics as part of 
a social reform programme,
50
 while the Agrarian League wanted to protect the Swedish racial stock 
from ‗inferior foreign racial elements‘.51 Elof Eriksson himself had played a role in the creation of 
the Agrarian League. The first sterilisation law was enacted in 1934, forcibly sterilising some 300 
people annually (predominantly women) until 1941, when the figure grew to roughly one 
thousand.
52
 This suggests that the racialism of Swedish fascists was neither exclusively copied 
from the Germans, nor was it necessarily perceived to be by the Swedish public. It was already too 
entrenched in Sweden‘s mainstream politics.53 
 
46
 ‗Väl kämpar den i alla länder för nationell renässans, kristen uppryckning och moralisk, psykisk och fysisk 
styrka och sundhet sett i rasforskningens och antisemitismens ljus, men dels är denna kamp helt och hållet 
arisk, dels är kristendomen i stort sett ariernas religion och slutligen: den ariska andan är helt olik andra 
rasers. [...]Vad vi har påpekat är hurusom fascismen icke är internationell utan ariskt universell.‘, 
‗Fascismens rätta definition‘, Spöknippet, no. 11, March (1928), p. 2. 
47
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(Stockholm: Universitetet Uppsala, 1969), pp. 144–46. 
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Överklassnazism, 1930-1945 (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1996), p. 258. 
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Thus racialism in its various aspects – racism, anti-Semitism, Aryanism – presented an attractive 
alternative for Swedish fascists to defend the transnational nature of fascism. Nationalism, which 
for years had been central to fascist ideology, brought them into constant conflict with fascism‘s 
foreign origins, while the discursive defences discussed earlier were unconvincing in many 
respects.
54
 But racialism could replace nationalism in fascist ideology, and conveniently assigned 
Swedes a place at the top of the Aryan racial hierarchy. In the words of a contemporary German 
student of Swedish fascism: ‗[t]he racial homogeneity of the Swedish people is almost without its 
equal in the world‘.55 The idea of Sweden as the pinnacle of a Nordic-Aryan race was not just 
appealing, but also supported by contemporary science.  
 
Nationalism forced Swedish fascists to confront their foreign ideological origins. International 
fascism was a menace to the mind of the Swedish public, and of increasing concern as democracy 
seemed to crumble in Europe.
56
 Fascist self-identity and nationalism constantly tended towards an 
irresolvable ideological dilemma. Racialism, on the other hand, could accommodate a multi-
national fascism: it admitted to kinship with the German Nazis, and other ‗Aryan‘ fascists, while 
explaining and justifying that kinship. The substitution of ‗fascism‘ with ‗National Socialism‘ was 
an essential part of assuming a racialist over a nationalist identity. 
 
In the early 1930s, articles more critical of Italy and Mussolini appeared:  
 
Mussolini came with his Fascism and no matter how beneficial and brilliant its 
accomplishment was, led by a hyper-intelligent statesman‘s will, we cannot turn 
away from the fact that Italy‘s fascism has not managed to raze the Western 
capitalist system [.…] It has no racial-biological foundation. Chaos in racial respects 
does not represent risk or shame to [Italian] Fascism.
57
 
 
Swedish fascists adopted an increasingly hostile attitude over the years. ‗Fascism‘ came to be 
associated with a foreign, southern ‗race‘, whose Latin culture was alien to the Aryans, ironically 
incorporating ‗alien ideology‘ criticism into their own ideology. ‗Fascism‘ was even declared to be 
54
 ‗Samling under fascismens fälttecken!‘ Nationen, no 36, September (1926), p. 1. 
55
 ‗Die rassische Homogenität des schwedischen Volkes ist fast ohne Gegenstück in der Welt.‘ Kurt Mall, 
Der Nationalsozialismus in Schweden im Spiegel seiner Kampfpresse, PhD Thesis (Heidelberg, 1936), p. 14. 
56
 Louise Drangel, Den Kämpande Demokratin: En Studie i Antinazistisk Opinionsrörelse 1935-1945 
(Stockholm: LiberFörlag, 1976), pp. 20–22. 
57
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störta det väst-kapitalistiska systemet. [...] Den har ingen rasbiologisk grundval. Kaos i rashänseende är för 
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an ideology of oppression antithetical to National Socialism.
58
 In 1935, Riksposten proclaimed: 
‗We have no fascism in Sweden. Thank God!‘59 From the late 1920s through to the end of the 
1930s, Swedish fascist nationalism gave way to racialism, which harmonised with their fascist 
identity. This harmony of identity and ideology allowed Swedish fascists to answer criticism more 
convincingly: ‗National socialism is not German, not Swedish, not Danish etc. It is Nordic!‘.60 
Racism is frequently understood as a sort of heightened form of nationalism or an aspect of ultra-
nationalism, but racism could also exist independently of nationalism – even if it had usually been 
allied with nationalism since the nineteenth century.
61
  
 
In interwar Sweden, racialism helped native fascists outgrow a narrow nationalism, transcending 
national boundaries. As racialism replaced nationalism, contradictions were resolved, and a lasting 
self-identity emerged. Although fascism is commonly described as nationalist, and this was 
initially recognised as its defining feature by fascists themselves, racialism became the defining 
element in the 1930s. Nationalism had prompted fascists to foreground their own indigenous 
traditions and political ideas, against Italy and Germany, which is precisely what opened up the 
possibility of a racialist fascism. 
 
However, changes in Swedish fascist ideology were not exclusively governed discursively, as the 
organic development of fascist self-identity ended up shipwrecked on account of the international 
political situation of the late 1930s. While fascists tried to work out their precise relationship to 
race and nation, public opinion forced another transformation as Hitler‘s expansionist project in 
Europe tainted the Swedish fascists‘ image. 
 
The name of Mussolini‘s Fascism stuck to those in Sweden who now preferred to call themselves 
National Socialists, and their disavowal helped little when they still recognised the kinship of 
movements abroad that had retained the name of ‗fascism‘, (such as the BUF in Britain).62 The 
Spanish Civil War reinforced the impression of a ‗Fascist International‘; and despite the National 
Socialists‘ best efforts, the press continued, perhaps unsurprisingly, to use the terms National 
Socialism and fascism interchangeably. But in Sweden it was above all Germany‘s actions, 
especially in domestic politics – the Night of the Long Knives, the Nuremberg Laws, 
58
 ‗Fascism betyder förtryck och kapitalism‘, Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten, no 3:10, February 6 (1935), 
pp. 1, 4.  
59
 ‗Vi ha ingen fascism i Sverige. Gud ske lov!‘, ‗Är Greve Eric von Rosen fascist?‘, Riksposten, no 26 
(1935), p. 4. Cf. a similar attitude in the original Furugård party, Wärenstam, p. 34. 
60
 ‗Nationalsocialismen är icke tysk, icke svensk, icke dansk o.s.v. den är nordisk!‘, Folkwang, 
‗Nationalsocialism är ej import!‘, Riksposten, nos 35-36, October (1937), p. 4. Cf. Mall, p. 39. 
61
 George L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism (New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1999), p. 67. 
62
 For instance ‗Pauli brev om fascismen‘, Riksposten, no 6, July (1934), p. 1. 
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Reichskristallnacht – which were controversial and aroused suspicions that fascists were planning 
to do something similar in Sweden.
63
 
 
In October 1938 Lindholm‘s NSAP had become the largest Swedish fascist party, but the NSAP‘s 
electoral failure (it remained firmly below the 4% parliamentary threshold), combined with 
Germany‘s behaviour, drove Lindholm to despair.64 In a highly revealing letter to Sven Hedengren 
in September that year, Lindholm expressed his frustration with their unrelenting marginalisation: 
 
We‘re not getting anywhere! I do not doubt that, with great sacrifices and effort we 
could gather ca 20 000 votes even in 1940, and in 1942-44 and so on. But Germany 
is in our way so bloody much, so it isn‘t possible. People are mad, and what is 
happening these days one will never forget. Hitler – Nazism – War, murder, misery! 
Because of this I now consider it impossible to stop this madness. The only 
conceivable [way forward], if the ideas are to be saved, would be to get rid of both 
name and symbol, not to mention boots, cross strap, and ‗Hitler salute‘. I know it is 
a dangerous step, for most of our members would perhaps lose interest. But surely 
we aren‘t fighting to always remain a union for merely expressing our opinions, 
limited to a few thousand people, but to get somewhere.
65
 
 
Lindholm acted accordingly, and the NSAP became Svensk-Socialistisk Samling [SSS, Swedish-
Socialist Union]. The fascist salute was abolished, as was the kamp hell [hail struggle] greeting. A 
new battle cry was introduced: ‗We want – Sweden for the Swedes‘. The swastika was replaced 
with the Vasa sheaf.
66
 The newspaper changed its name from Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten to 
Den Svenske Folksocialisten [The Swedish People‘s Socialist].67 Local party formations were 
informed that the contents of the party programme and the ideology remained the same, even 
though the name had changed: ‗You still fight in our ranks for national socialism, though it 
happens under the name of Swedish-Socialism or Swedish People‘s Socialism.‘68 During the war, 
63
 Dahlberg, p. 202; Wärenstam, p. 100. 
64
 Hagtvet, p. 715. 
65
 ‗Vi kommer ingenstans! Jag betvivlar inte, att vi med stora offer och ansträngningar skulle kunna trumma 
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66
 Wärenstam, p. 100. 
67
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Lindholm pointed out in his book Svensk Frihetskamp [Swedish Freedom Struggle] that anything 
that was similar to the Germans in the Swedish struggle was nothing to be ashamed of, but ‗it was 
now more necessary than before to underline our national independence‘.69 The declaration marks a 
turning-point in the history of Swedish fascism. While the ideology would not undergo any more 
significant alterations after this point, the name and much of the image were sacrificed – and with it 
an explicit fascist identity. The largest fascist party had become the SSS, and though this strain of 
fascism in Sweden remained ideologically consistent, its presentation changed.  
  
Correspondingly, in the late thirties far fewer far-right movements called themselves fascist. One 
interesting example is Frihetsrörelsen [FR, The Freedom Movement]. Founded in December 1937 
with the support of Eriksson‘s Nationen – the same paper which had supported the SFKO twelve 
years earlier – the new movement largely conformed to the ideology of earlier Swedish fascists, 
except perhaps in its radical Lutheranism. Headed by chairman and ‗warrior of the spirit‘, pastor 
Ernst Ålander, it sought ‗a new Sweden, a Swedish spiritual and national renewal‘.70 ‗It is Nordic-
Swedish in essence, has roots in the Swedish racial heritage and derives its impulse from the 
wellspring of the Swedish spirit.‘ Nationen exclaimed: ‗The Truth was and remains the way to 
rebirth, to the people‘s salvation from annihilation in Jewish Satanism [sic].‘71  
 
Viciously anti-Semitic (and anti-Catholic), the movement advocated a ‗Nordic Renaissance on a 
real, racial foundation‘, alongside the renewal of Christianity in a tougher form; that is, without its 
Judaic legacy. FR commended Nazi Germany for its leadership in racial thought, but found it too 
supportive (!) of the Jews.
72
 Similarly to the Deutsche Christen in Nazi Germany who attempted to 
create a specifically anti-Jewish Church on the basis of race as a sacred principle,
73
 there was a 
petition for ‗the removal of the Old Testament from the Christian message: ‗We want a Christian 
Bible, not a Bible that consists of ¾ Jewish tales and stories‘.74 In some ways, the FR represented 
the culmination of ideological developments of the thirties. Their programme of anti-Semitism and 
spiritual, national, and racial rebirth indicates the absorption of the racialist ideas that proliferated 
69
 ‗Det var nu nödvändigare än tidigare, att understryka vår nationella självständighet.‘ Sven Olov Lindholm, 
Svensk Frihetskamp (Stockholm, 1943), p. 34. 
70
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förnyelse.‘, ‗Andens stridsman‘, Nationen, no 2, February (1938), p. 1. 
71
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among Swedish fascists in the late 1920s and 1930s. Moreover there was a recognition of kinship 
with Nazi Germany while the rhetoric clearly associates them with earlier Swedish fascists (not to 
mention Ålander‘s prior membership of the NSB).75 But crucially, they rejected the signifier 
‗fascism‘. At no point did they assert any affinity with fascism beyond expressing admiration for 
Germany‘s racialist ideas. FR is perhaps the first group to recognise how tainted the name of 
fascism had become in Sweden. Consequently, the movement proclaimed its ideology with a name 
and image entirely distinct from conventional fascism. 
 
By 1937-38, Swedish fascists had reached a point where racialism – earlier little more than an 
ideological footnote – had become the core of their political programme. The international situation 
and Nazi Germany‘s behaviour in the latter half of the 1930s had turned their fascist image into a 
liability. At the margins of Swedish politics, with no hope of crossing the parliamentary threshold, 
FR spurned ‗fascism‘. Where racialism had earlier in that decade replaced nationalism as the 
defining feature of Swedish fascist self-identity, by the end of the 1930s it had effectively 
subsumed fascism. International politics had made the image of fascism untenable, leaving an 
anonymous transnational racialism in its wake. Per Engdahl, one of the most influential figures of 
Swedish fascism after 1945, is exemplary of this trend. First a member of SFKO, he promoted a 
racialist notion of New Swedishess throughout the 1930s and 1940s in organisations like Sveriges 
Nationella Förbund [National League of Sweden] and Svensk Opposition.
76
 Members of former 
fascists groups would from this point on find shelter under such generic names; Engdahl himself 
felt compromised by the label of ‗fascism‘ until the end of his life.77 
 
While Lindholm realised in 1938 that ‗the swastika had turned into bad advertisement‘, as wartime 
critic Holger Carlsson put it, the label of Nazism indelibly stuck to him and his party.
78
 The initial 
German military success prompted a temporary resurgence of National Socialist symbols and 
greetings in the SSS, while post-war journalism would not let the public forget Lindholm‘s old 
allegiances and politics.
79
 In the 1970s and 1980s, when Lindholm had become mostly focused on 
international peace efforts and protesting nuclear proliferation, he still complained of the media‘s 
treatment of his past as fascist leader.
80
 I will not examine the wartime period here, but a cursory 
glance shows that in many ways the attempt at anonymisation was a complete failure in Sweden, 
compromised by their past support for Nazi Germany, especially when Norway and Denmark were 
75
 Nilsson, pp. 106–8; Wärenstam, pp. 47–48. 
76
 Lööw, Nazismen i Sverige, 1924-1979, pp. 46–52. 
77
 Berggren, ‗Swedish Fascism‘, p. 400. 
78
 Carlsson, p. 92. 
79
 Sastamoinen, pp. 38–39, 190. 
80
 Gothenburg, Regional & City Archive, Letter Lindholm to Ingmar Svensson, 15.12.1983, Rönninge, 
Ingemar Svensson‘s Archive. 
16 
occupied by the Wehrmacht.
81
 Under these conditions Swedish fascists were always at risk of 
having another label applied to them: ‗quisling‘.82 Armas Sastamoinen‘s journalistic work on 
Swedish fascist groups, especially the SSS, presented a picture of them as carbon copies of German 
Nazism, dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Swedish state. The title of the 1947 book is 
revealing: Hitler’s Swedish Vanguards. 
 
The new path taken, hesitantly and without success, by Lindholm and the SSS was not always 
followed by other fascist movements, some of who clung to their fascist self-identity. For instance, 
in November 1938 Nils-Erik Björkman founded Solkorset [The Sun Cross], a small but fanatical 
National Socialist group, with an unambiguous party symbol.
83
 Yet in the long run, the SSS 
heralded the coming of a new era for fascism in Sweden. ‗Anonymous fascism‘ – a fascism that 
previously identified itself as fascist hiding its ideological kinship and denying any connection to 
the fascist regimes –became a hallmark of fascist movements after 1945. In the first two post-war 
decades several new organisations with clear ideological and personal links to the movements of 
the 1930s were created, but without names to identify them as such. The neo-fascist group 
Nordiska Nationalsocialistiska Kampförbundet [Nordic National Socialist Combat League], 
founded 1955, quickly changed its name to the less offensive Nordiska Rikspartiet [Nordic 
National Party], (briefly led by Lindholm‘s ex-wife, Vera Oredsson).84 If Sverigedemokraterna 
[Sweden Democrats, founded 1988] are regarded as part of this history,
85
 and many post-war 
fascists undeniably found their way into this party,
86
 then it is clear that they learnt the lesson about 
anonymisation, and with rather greater success than Lindholm. 
 
Anonymisation is the stage in political development which occurs when the political climate 
becomes acutely hostile to the ideological signifier. At this point, maintaining that self-identity, 
being representative of that ideology, guarantees political obscurity. For fascists to anonymise 
themselves in this sense meant to discard identifying features associated with their politics, without 
changing the ideology. The adoption of this tactic in the 1930s highlights that Swedish fascists 
understood that the public strongly identified fascism by its appearance, its outer trappings: ‗name 
and symbol, not to mention boots, cross strap and Hitler salute‘. Arguably examining the historical 
81
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process of fascist anonymisation could also be important for understanding the identities and 
ideologies of far-right groups in post-war Europe, and the connections to their interwar 
predecessors.
87
 
 
Conclusion 
With this analysis I hope to have demonstrated the value of understanding Swedish fascist 
movements in their own right, rather than as satellites of fascist regimes, as some scholars have 
dismissed them.
88
 In scholarship it has always been common to concentrate the discussion on the 
regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in approaches to generic fascism, which has risked a 
distortion of our understanding of what fascism meant as a European phenomenon. Sadly, research 
into smaller fascist movements remains scarce, and this is particularly true of Sweden. In spite of 
Lena Berggren‘s call in 2002 for engagement with this topic, there has hitherto still been little 
change in the field, with a few notable exceptions in recent years. These appear to have been 
brought about by the rise of the Sweden Democrats in recent years, encouraging a new perspective 
on the far-right‘s historical background.89 However, most of what has recently been written on 
Swedish fascism is in Swedish, making it inaccessible to most scholars interested in fascism, who 
remain forced to rely on out of date information.
90
 This chapter is a small contribution to remedy 
the situation. 
 
Using the idea of self-identity, I have traced how an inherent tension between nationalism and 
fascist identity generated the impetus for the interplay of nominal and ideological change, from the 
early twenties, to the late thirties. The conventional understanding of the Italian Fascist regime as a 
model for other fascists holds true for most of the first decade. Political parties such as SFKO, and 
leaders like Birger Furugård, Per Engdahl, Elof Eriksson, and Sven Olov Lindholm, did not mind 
associating themselves with the foreigners who inspired their political project, and were keen to 
sing their praise. This picture had to be immediately qualified however, as Swedish fascists were 
soon forced to respond to criticism, sympathetic and inimical, which questioned their nationalism. 
The tactics used to answer their critics foreclosed a full acknowledgment of foreign influences, and 
instead opened a path for Swedish fascists to understand their ideology as something truly Swedish. 
No doubt encouraged by the second wave of fascism, heralded by the rise of Hitler‘s NSDAP in 
Germany, Swedish fascists naturalised their ideology by foregrounding indigenous traditions and 
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political and intellectual currents such as racialism, xenophobia, and eugenics.
91
 While these tactics 
were intended to make fascism appear less exotic, they pushed Swedish fascists towards a racialist 
ideology, which actually displaced nationalism, strictly speaking. 
 
This Swedish case study thus sheds a little light on the nominal shift of far-right movements from 
‗fascism‘ to ‗National Socialism‘. Here I have suggested that while the transformation was 
ideologically superficial, it was a matter of some political importance, as the popularisation of the 
National Socialist signifier seemed to present fascists with precisely the sword they needed to cut 
their Gordian knot of nationalism. The haste with which Swedish fascists embraced the new name 
points to just how troubling ‗fascism‘ was as a signifier for nationalists beyond Italy. While the 
nominal shift did not immediately entail ideological change, in the long run it opened and 
foreclosed other potential paths of fascist ideological development, and heavily encouraged 
anonymisation in the late thirties. 
 
This case study has also attacked the idea of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as being simply 
‗models‘ for smaller fascist movements. While their influence was undeniable and strong, the 
relationship could completely undermine the credibility and respectability of indigenous fascist 
groups, which could not express support for the regimes without tainting their own image. 
Eriksson, Furugård, and Lindholm all had some sort of contact with Nazi Germany, yet it is 
doubtful these connections were ever of any help. The regimes were at least as much obstacles to, 
rather than models for, political success. Italian and German fascism undeniably had a considerable 
impact on the ideology and political culture of Swedish fascism, but this impact was never just one 
of simple adoption – in fact, it ultimately encouraged a rather unexpected introversion in Swedish 
fascism. 
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